The interpretation in tax matters.

Abstract

Abstract. This work is based on the assumption that language is a constituting element of law. Language not only talks about the object (Science of Law), but also participates in its constitution (positive law). Although it is true that there is no legal phenomenon without written or unwritten regulations, it is also true that one cannot imagine law without a language, either idiomatic or not, which can act as an expression vehicle. 
I hold the conception that to interpret means to place values on symbols, i.e., assign 
meanings, and through these, references to objects. The interpretative proposal contained
in this article is obviously based on certain assumptions and searches for adequate instruments to explore texts of positive law in depth, breaking them down into four interpretative
subsystems, all of them classified as legal. These divisions are obviously merely epistemological, their boundaries being unable to visualize when treating literality of
texts superficially.