TOMA DE DECISIONES ECONÓMICAS: EL APORTE COGNITIVO EN LA RUTA DE SIMON, ALLAIS Y TVERSKY Y KAHNEMAN
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22235/cp.v0i1.567Palabras clave:
psicología cognitiva, teorías económicas, toma de decisionesResumen
Desde sus comienzos como ciencia, la economía integró a sus proposiciones a la psicología. Esto fue particularmente notorio en el tema de la toma de decisiones económicas. Posteriormente, la economía se recuesta para elaborar sus construcciones científicas en el maximizador y omnisciente homo economicus y así se separa de la psicología. Empero, la explicación de la realidad de los modelos neoclásicos se fue tornando cada vez más imperfecta, mostrando las teorías numerosas anomalías. Prominentes científicos en la vena cognitiva comienzan, primero exponiendo las limitaciones a las teorías prevalecientes para luego continuar construyendo modelos alternativos enraizados en la psicología cognitiva. Los seminales aportes cognitivos de Herbert Simon y Maurice Allais, trazarían el camino a dos académicos pioneros, los psicólogos cognitivos Amos Tversky y Daniel Kahneman, que darían forma a un nuevo modelo que incorpora los avances de la psicología cognitiva a los modelos de toma de decisiones. El trabajo revisa este paradigmático ejemplo de interdisciplinariedad científica entre economía y psicología cognitiva, en la búsqueda de mejores explicaciones al proceso de toma de decisiones.
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